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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume 61

December, 1958

Number 1

WEST VIRGINIA NEGLIGENCE CASES AND LEGISLATIVE
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
RAY JAY DAvis*

J UDIiAL compensation for accidental injuries is giounded upon
legal fault 1 Assessment of fault involves not only finding the
facts concerning actions of the parties, but also evaluation of their
conduct 2 Determination is made whether the behavior is justified
and, consequently, does not give rise to recovery, or whether it
should be condemned, thus serving as a basis for compensation.
This, the ethical portion of the problem of negligence liability, is
performed by comparing the actions of a party with those of a hypothetical person, the reasonable man of ordinary prudence, acting
under similar circumstances.8 The infinite variety of fact patterns
that may arise dooms efforts in any single lawsuit to do much more
than give particularized content to this vague standard. But,
through use of standards of conduct established by legislative enactment, more stable measures of the character of behavior are made
available. 4
The expansion in the volume of statutes has increased the importance in negligence litigation in West Virginia courts of legislative provisions. In civil actions legislation is being used both by
plaintiffs and by defendants as a source for standards of conduct.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona; former Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1 See Chapter IV of PoumD, AN INTRODUCrION TO TzE PHILosoPHY OF LAW
144-90
2 (1922), for a discussion of the philosophical basis of tort liability.
Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv.
L. REv. 458 (1933).
3 PaossER, TORTS § 31 (2d ed. 1955).
4 REsTATEmEN'I, Tonrs § 285 (1934).
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This paper will examine some of those cases. Discussed herein will
be: (1) the effect of violation of legislative standards upon primary
negligence, (2) the impact of statutory nonobservance upon contributory negligence, and (3) the relevance in private litigation of
compliance with legislative provisions.
1. STATUTORY VIoLATIoNs AND FIPm

Y NEGLIGENCE

Legislatures are competent to establish by statute standards of
conduct and to provide civil remedies for their violation. Only in a
limited number of instances has the legislative assembly of West Virginia exercised this power.5 Therefore there are but few local
cases dealing with disobedience of such enactments. 6 These are
numerous enough, however, to establish that when such statutes are
sought to be relied upon several defenses might be employed. The
defendant may assert that he did not in fact ignore the statutory
standard.7 For example, in Krodel v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,8 a
parade of nineteen witnesses was used to establish the fact that the
engineer of a train which struck the plaintiff's automobile had complied with a law requiring warning signals to be given for grade
crossings and providing liability to parties injured by neglect to give
them. 9 Also the defendant might concede disobedience of the legislative mandate and still defeat the action, if he can convince the
court that the statute does not conform with some state or federal
constitutional provision.' 0 In Prager v. W. H. Chapman & Sons
Co." an employer successfully attacked a statutory provision which
5 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ch. 81, art, 2, § 8 (Michie 1955) (civil liability
for injuries caused by railroads through failure to give warning signals at grade

crossings); of. id. ch. 17, art. 10, § 17 (person injured because street out of
repair can sue city); id. ch. 17, art. 17, § 13 (highway officials can sue for
damages for injuries caused by violation of maximum load limits).

In Virginia the motor vehicle law specifically creates civil liability for
violations of the criminal statutes contained therein. VA. CODE ch. 29, art. 5,
§ 8-646.8 (Michie 1950). This provision was applied in Kidd v. Little, 194
Va. 692, 74 S.E.2d 787 (1958).
6 The bulk of these cases are cited in the annotations to the code provisions cited in note 5 supra.
7 For a discussion of statutes where a civil remedy is expressly provided
see, 2 H.umumE & J.mas, TORTS § 17.5 (1956). This section and the following
one are adopted from James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident
Cases, 11 LA. L. REv. 95 (1950). Therefore any citations to those sections

of the treatise may also be found in the article.
899 W. Va. 374, 128 S.E. 824 (1925).
9W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 2, § 8 (Michie 1955).
10 REsT,%vr, TORTS § 286, comment b (1934). For cases from other

jurisdictions, see 2 HAL~ ai & JAmES, TORTS § 17.5
Va. 428, 9 S.E.2d 880 (1940).
11 122 WV.
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created a standard of liability without fault in common law negligence actions against nonsubscribers to the workmen's compensation
fund.12 The court found that the statute deprived him of due process of law. Furthermore the person who has not obeyed the statute
may challenge the applicability of the civil remedy provisions by
proving either that the resulting injury caused by his conduct was
not to a plaintiff within the class of persons protected by the statute
or that it was not produced by a hazard at which the enactment was
aimed.1 3 Thus it has been held that the railroad warning signal law
was not intended for the protection of railroad employees, 14 trespassers upon railway property,15 or cattle,16 but only of highway
17
travelers and perhaps of passengers and nontrespassing strangers.
A comparatively rare type of legislation brands as criminal departures from standards established by it, and in addition makes the
penalty payable to the person injured by the breach.' 8 A provision
of the West Virginia Code stipulates that such a person is entitled
just to the penalty if it is "expressly mentioned to be in lieu of...
damages."19
By far the greatest number of statutes considered by the courts
in negligence cases are exclusively criminal in nature. They provide
a penalty for breach of the stipulated standard of conduct; they contain no express civil liability provision. On its face that would seem
to indicate that only criminal liability should ensue from violation of
such provisions. That, however, is not the case.20 In spite of the

12The statute, as amended, now appears at W. VA. CODE ch. 23, art. 2,
§ 8 (Michie 1955).
18 This is a question of statutory construction. For Restatement provisions concerning such construction, see RESTATM
T, TORTS §§ 286 (a),
(c), and comment b (1934). For cases from other jurisdictions, see 2 HARim
& JAMES, TonRTs § 17.5.
14 Jones v. Virginian By., 74 W. Va. 666, 83 S.E. 54 (1914).
15 Shirley v. Norfork & W. By., 107 W. Va. 21, 147 S.E. 705 (1929).
16 Toudy v. Norfork & W. By., 38 W. Va. 694, 18 S.E. 896 (1894).
17 Randall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 109 U.S. 478, 485 (1883).
18 See, e.g., W. VA. CoDE ch. 87, art. 5, § 1 (Michie 1955). For application of this provision, see Beuke v. Boggs Run Mining & Mfg. Co., 100 W.
Va. 141, 130 S.E. 132 (1925); Mapel v. John, 42 W. Va. 30, 24 S.E. 608
(1896). See also the cases cited in the annotations to this provision.
19 W. VA.CODE ch. 55, art. 7, § 9 (Michie 1955). The Virginia Code contains a similar provision. VA. CoDE ch. 29, art. 6, § 8-652 (Michie Supp. 1954).
See also RESTATm
T, ToRTS § 287 (1934); PhossE, ToRTs § 84.
20 Brumfield v. Wofford, 102 S.E.2d 103, 104 (W. Va. 1958).
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fact that a penalty or forfeiture might be imposed against the defendant in a criminal proceeding, according to our code:
"Any person injured by the violation of any statute may recover
damages as he may sustain by reason of
from the offender such
2 1
the violation... .
This West Virginia law is based on a similar Virginia provision.2 2 The courts of Virginia have held that their enactment merely
saves any common law rights in tort that might otherwise be considered lost by virtue of imposition of criminal sanctions for commission
of the same deeds. 23 In the language of a federal court case considering the provision
"It cannot be supposed that in enacting ... [the statute] the
legislature had the remotest idea of creating any new ground
for bringing an action for damages. It was only intended to
keep the subject just where it was under the common law before
the enactment of... [the criminal provision.] "24
States in the union, other than the Virginias, have enacted interpretative provisions in their codes which state that criminal statutes do not
deny right to recover civil claims. 25 Our provision is more than a
negative statement; it appears affirmatively to grant civil rights.
Nevertheless the court of appeals has followed the Virginia interpretation.26 It merely prevents criminal laws from barring civil rights;
21W. VA. CODE
22
VA. CODE ch.

ch. 55, art. 7, § 9 (Michie 1955).
29, art. 6, § 8-652 (Michie Supp. 1954).

23

Oliver v. Cashin, 192 Va. 540, 65 S.E.2d 571 (1951); Wyatt v. Chesapeake &Potomac Tel. Co., 158 Va. 470, 163 S.E. 370 (1932); Miller Mfg. Co. v.
Loving, 125 Va. 255, 99 S.E. 591 (1919); Hortenstine v. Virginia-Carolina By.,
102 Va. 914, 47 S.E. 996 (1904); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Irvine, 84 Va. 553, 5
S.E. 532 (1888); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Reynolds Bros., 77 Va. 173 (1883).
This statute is also cited in Standard Red Cedar Chest Co. v. Monroe, 125 Va.
442, 99 S.E. 589 (1919); Connelly v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100 Va. 51, 40
618 (1902); Richmond & D.R.R. v. Noell, 86 Va. 19, 9 S.E. 473 (1889).
S.E. 24
Tyler v. Western Union Tel. Co., 54 Fed. 634, 637 (C.C.W.D. Va.
1893).25
See, e.g., Aaz. REv. STAT. § 1-253 (1956); OnE. 11Ev. STAT. § 161.060
(1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 559 (1954). But see Omo REv. CoDE § 1.16
(1958);
Ky. REv. STAT. § 446.070 (1955).
26
England v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 86 W. Va. 575, 104 S.E. 46
(1920); Mapel v. John, 42 W. Va. 30, 24 S.E. 608 (1896). The West Virginia provision has been also cited in Pitzer v. M. D. Tomkies & Sons, 1386
W. Va. 268, 67 S.E.2d 437 (1951), 54 W. VA. L. REv. 321 (1952); Powell v.
Mitchell, 120 W. Va. 9, 196 S.E. 158 (1938).
These holdings are reinforced in connection with speed violations by W.
VA. CoDE ch. 17C, art. 6, § 6 (Michie 1955). It specifically requires the plaintiff to prove negligence in civil actions where violation of a speed limit is
involved.
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it grants no such rights. Thus in Englandv. CentralPocahontasCoal
Co.,27 the court upheld recovery not on the basis of violation of a

statute making disinterment a felony, but on the basis of a pre-existing common law right to preserve the remains of a relative.
Although the state supreme court has not fully articulated the
reasons for its stand that disobedience of the criminal law might
produce civil liability, there are several artful explanations which
have been advanced from other quarters to explain this phenomenon.2 8 One approach, which apparently is still fashionable in England, is to construe the enactment to find an unexpressed intent to
impose civil liability.2 9 This is wholly fictional, for had the legislature had civil consequences in mind, it could have provided for
them. 0 Perhaps re-enactment of a provision which has been judicially utilized to impose civil liability might indicate an intent to
establish private rights.8 ' But even in that instance it is rather speculative to make an effort to uncover such an intent.
Professor Thayer's classic article on this subject explained that a
reasonable man certainly would obey the law, and that one who fails
to do so is not conducting himself as a reasonable man. Therefore
he must be negligent.32 This explanation overlooks the fact that
while in general reasonable men do conform to the criminal law,
there are instances in which they quite justifiably do not.88 Nevertheless Thayer's approach has the virtue of tying what courts are
doing in this area to the usual negligence standard of the reasonable
man of ordinary prudence.
If the legislature has not expressed an intent to create private
liability, then an order for compensation by a court must rest on
27 86 W. Va. 575, 577, 104 S.E. 46, 47 (1920).
28
See, e.g., 2 HAPER & J,E.s,
ToRTs § 17.6; PRossER, TORTS § 34;
Lowndes, Civil Liability by Criminal Legislation, 16 MwN. L. REv. 361
(1931); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HAMv. L. REv. 817
(1913).
29
See, e.g., Phillips v. Britannia Hygienic Laundry, [1932] 2 K.B. 832.
30 For condemnation of this approach, see Lowndes, supra note 28, at 363;
Thayer,
supra note 28, at 320.
31
Perhaps some such reasoning underlies the approach of the court to the
legislative intent in re-enactment of the child labor law. Pitzer v. M. D.
Tomkdes
& Sons, 136 W. Va. 268, 274, 67 S.E.2d 487, 442 (1951).
32
Thayer, supra note 28, at 822.
33 See, e.g., instances commented upon in the text at notes 50-62, infra.
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some species of judicial legislation. The West Virginia court has
recognized this in the leading case of Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co., in which Judge Robinson stated:
"A civil action does not get its force from . . . [the criminal]
statute. It only looks to4 the violation of the statute for evidence
to support the action."
The courts in these negligence cases are seeking to effectuate the
underlying policy for protection of certain persons which they believe to be expressed in the criminal legislation. 35
Statutory purpose doctrine. In order to give effect to statutory
policy it is necessary for judges to determine the applicability of the
facts to the enactment under consideration. For that reason the supreme court has dictated that plaintiffs must plead sufficiently definite facts to establish violation of the provision they are asking a
judge to invoke.38 Also injured parties must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the statute was in fact violated. 37
On the basis of the facts it is up to the court to determine
whether the injured party has brought himself within the scope of
the enactment An effort should be made to ascertain its purpose,
the object as well as the import.38 This involves more than merely
looking at the face of the provision; it means judicially determining
the basic policy underlying the law.39 Here judges are in the business of de:fining the scope of protection given by the rule invoked by

s468 W. Va. 405, 412, 69 S.E. 857, 860 (1910).
35 The attitude of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in this
regard has been expressed in Pitzer v. M. D. Tomkies & Sons, 186 W. Va. 268,
274, 67 S.E.2d 437, 442 (1951) (overrules prior position that contributory
negligence of a child is a defense in child labor cases on the ground that to
permit such a defense "virtually emasculates" the intent of the legislature);
Bobbs v. Morgantown Press Co., 89 W. Va. 206, 209, 108 S.E. 879, 880 (1921)
("It is the duty of the courts to effectuate its beneficent purpose").
See also P:uossE,, TowRs § 34.

a Clark v. Ohio R.R.R., 34 W. Va. 200, 12 S.E. 505 (1890).
37
Somerville v. Dellosa, 133 W. Va. 435, 56 S.E.2d 756 (1949).
88
Thayer, supra note 28, at 319.
39 Cf. Lowndes, supra note 28, at 862-64.
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the complainant 4 0 This is particularly true where the legislative
41
standard is vaguely expressed.
Sometimes the plaintiff has quite clearly not brought himself
within the reach of the legislative rule he seeks to employ. No recovery would be given, for example, to child laborers who have not
demonstrated that they were "employees" of the defendant,42 or to
administrators, claiming that a speeding defendant has not slowed
for decedents while they were walking on a "travelled portion" of the
highway, who have not tried to show that they were in fact on such
part of the road.43 And in other instances the applicable statute indicates an intent to exclude a certain situation from its scope. Thus
the provision of the motor vehicle code requiring travel on the right
side of the road has several well-defined exceptions. A plaintiff injured by a defendant who is within one of them cannot recover.44
There are instances in which a law appears to include the conduct of the defendant and yet a court "interprets" the statute not to
do so. In the leading case of Tedla v. Ellman 45 the New York Court
of Appeals considered a traffic law which apparently had been disobeyed. It rejected the notion that the legislature had required adherence to the letter of the provision when it would be unreasonable
to follow it. Therefore an exception to permit reasonable deviations
was manufactured. The courts of West Virginia have accomplished
the same thing by permitting disabled automobiles46 and wreckers 47
40 Cf. Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L.
RBv. 43, 8 (1927).
1 The statute applied in Tarr v. Keller Lumber & Constr. Co., 106 W. Va.
99, 144 S.E. 881 (1928), created a duty to guard power-driven saws "if possible to do so." This vague provision was interpreted by the court to mean that
such saws must be guarded if doing so did not unreasonably interfere with
their operation. Id. at 101, 144 S.E. at 882.
For illustrations of indefinite legislative standards, see BEsTATEMENT,
TonTs § 285, illustrations 4, 5 (1934).
42
Harper v. Cook, 139 W. Va. 917, 82 S.E.2d 427 (1954).
43
Fleming v. McMillan, 125 W. Va. 856, 26 S.E.2d 8 (1943).
44 Compare Vance v. Logan Williamson Bus Co., 131 W. Va. 296, 46
S.E.2d 783 (1948); Elswick v. Charleston Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 241, 36
S.E.2d 419 (1945); Ewing v. Chapman, 91 W. Va. 641, 114 S.E. 158 (1922),
with Parks v. Tillis, 112 W. Va. 295, 164 S.E. 797 (1932).
45 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987 (1939).
46
Miller v. Douglas, 121 W. Va. 638, 5 S.E.2d 799 (1939); Comment, 48
W. VA. L.Q. 57 (1941).
47
Cooper v. Teter, 123 W. Va. 872, 15 S.E.2d 152, 48 W. Va. L.Q. 57
(1941).
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to park on a road if doing so is reasonable. That action, which
normally would violate the criminal law, is by means of "interpretation" here held not to.48 This construction is in line with a policy
49
of strict interpretation of criminal statutes.
Excused violations. While the statutory purpose doctrine proceeds on the assumption that in legal contemplation there has not
been a breach of law,50 the excused violation doctrine recognizes that
there has been disobedience of a criminal statute, but states that the
circumstances were such that the rigor of the civil law should not
apply.
When a defendant is guilty of a crime he may be relieved of
negligence liability on the ground that comformity to the criminal
law was impossible under the circumstances involved. 51 Unless such
persons were freed of civil consequences here there would result
negligence without fault 52 That runs contrary to the basic reason
for negligence liability. Impossibility in an absolute sense is rare.
But the extreme difficulty of obeying a statute might lead a court to
absolve the disobedient party in a civil case. For example, in a case
from the District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia a
gasoline truck, which was required by state law to stop at all railway
crossings, failed to stop. A collision with a train resulted. The court
decided, however, that the violation should be excused because it
was so difficult to detect the presence of the crossing. The federal
appeals court accepted that ruling. 58 Of course customary noncompliance is not the same thing as impossibility of compliance. It is
negligence. 54 Also noncompliance by other persons subject to the
48 PRossER, TORTS § 34.
490 Somerville v. Dellosa, 133 W. Va. 485, 56 S.E.2d 756 (1949).

RESTTATmvENT, TORTS § 286, comment c (1934).
51 Elsvrick v. Charleston Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 241, 250, 36 S.E.2d
419, 425 (1945) (dictum); Stogdon v. Charleston Transit Co., 127 W. Va.
286, 291, 32 S.E.2d 276, 279 (1944) (dictum). See also Giancarlo v. Karabanowski, 124 Conn. 223, 198 Aft. 752 (1938).
52 MoRIus, TORTS 157-58 (1952). Chapter IV of this treatise is a reprint
of Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLum. L.
11Ev. 21 (1949). The citations herein to the treatise may also be found in the
article.
53 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Elk Refining Co., 186 F.2d 30, 32 (4th Cir.
1950).54 Elswick v. Charleston Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 241, 36 S.E.2d 419
(1945); Stogdon v. Charleston Transit Co., 127 W. Va. 286, 32 S.E.2d 276
(1944); Tarr v. Keller Lumber & Constr. Co., 106 W. Va. 99, 144 S.E. 881
(1928).
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same law is no defense,5 5 nor is the fact that an official inspector
excused the violation.5 6
Courts also recognize that breaches of the criminal law resulting from an emergency over which the defendant has no control are
not negligent. 57 He must demonstrate, though, that the emergency
was really the cause of the accident. 58 Furthermore, in words of
the West Virginia court:
"A driver may not violate the law of the road, and then invoke
the doctrine of sudden emergency to relieve himself from liability to another who is injured as a result of his violation. Such
rule is applicable to those who are themselves without fault, not
those who are at the time committing a wrong. 59
If, in order to avoid creating liability without fault, emergency
violators are excused, then other nonfaulty lawbreakers also should
not be held.60 Violations other than those which are beyond the
defendant's control and those which are caused by emergencies may
also be justified. Thus in Morris v. Wheeling61 operators of a gasoline station were excused from noncompliance with a legislative rule
requiring removal of snow and ice on a sidewalk abutting the property leased by them. The oil company men had removed the snow
and thrice had had a go at getting off the ice. The court found that
there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could find they had
made a "reasonable effort" to comply with the provision. In other
words their disobedience was justifiable. Not every lame excuse,
however, should satisfy a court of justification for a statutory breach.
After all the defendant in these cases is guilty of criminal conduct.
"Thayer's statement that reasonable men do not violate the criminal
law is usually true-in most cases the tort litigant who has broken a
62
penal statute is clearly negligent."
Class of persons protected. In cases involving breach of statutes
of an exclusively criminal character, as well as in those applying laws
55 Tarr v. Keller Lumber & Constr. Co., 106 W. Va. 99, 144 S.E. 881
(1928).
56Ibid.
57
58 Monms, TORTS 157-58.
Somerville v. Dellosa, 188 W. Va. 435, 56 S.E.2d 756 (1949).
59
Cline v. Christie, 117 W. Va. 192, 195, 184 S.E. 854, 855 (1936). See
also Chaney
v. Moore, 101 W. Va. 621, 184 S.E. 204 (1926).
6
0Moms, TORTS 158.
61 140 W. Va. 78, 82 S.E.2d 536 (1954).
62
Morons, TORTS 160.
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containing specific civil remedies, 63 a defendant might urge that the
plaintiff was not within the class of persons protected by the enactment. 64 The court has said that:
"In order for a statute to apply and to be a protection to persons
seeking to avail themselves of its terms, those invoking it must
be within the class of persons that it is intended to embrace." 65
Therefore a statute designed for the protection of persons lawfully on
a highway may not be invoked by a plaintiff who was not lawfully
there. 66 On the other hand a child injured by someone illegally passing a school bus may recover.6 7 So too might an industrial laborer
whose injury was brought about by his employer's violation of a factory act which was passed for the benefit of workers in factories.6 8
In these instances the legislature sought merely to protect a limited
class of individuals. It could also strive in other legislation to prevent injmies to very broad groups. Thus pure food acts, statutes
requiring labelling of poisons, and laws forbidding sale of firearms to
minors are designed to benefit any member of the public who may be
injured by the forbidden act.6 9
Some statutes are intended exclusively to protect state or city
interests, or merely to secure to individuals the enjoyment of privileges or rights to which they are entitled only as members of the
public. Since that sort of legislation does not establish any standard
of conduct for individuals toward each other, violations do not make
the actor liable for an invasion of the interest of another caused
thereby.7 0 Thus laws inhibiting various Sunday activities are devised to protect general community interests, rather than any partic63 See cases cited in notes 14-17, supra.
64 1 SM7ARaAN & REDFnID, NEcLaGENCE § 11 (rev. ed. 1941); RsrATEENT, TORTS § 286 (a) (1934).
6
5Parsons v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 115 W. Va. 450, 457, 176
S.E. 862, 865 (1934).
'Not only must the interest invaded be one of a person included in the
class protected by the statute, but also it must be the sort of interest the enactment is intended to protect. RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 286 (b) (1934). See also
id. at § 286, comment g and illustration 2.
66
Steiner v. Muldrew, 114 W. Va. 801, 173 S.E. 891 (1934).
67 Cf. Jones v. Berry, 180 W. Va. 189, 45 S.E.2d 1 (1947).
68 Cf. I1ErATEMENT, ToRTs § 286, illustration 1 (1934).
6
9See cases cited in PRossma, TORTS § 34 notes 20-22.
70 1 SBE N
& RmEFnmD, NEGLIGENCE § 12; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §
288 (1934).
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ular class of persons. 71 Licensing and registration provisions create
only a public duty.72 The same is true of duties imposed upon public officials by statute. 73 In these instances the person disobeying the
enactment will prevail.
Provisions requiring removal of snow and ice from sidewalks by
owners and tenants of abutting property are usually considered
merely to create an obligation to the municipality.7 4 Under the
West Virginia Code the cities themselves might be liable to the persons injured by failure to clear streets and sidewalks. 75 Furthermore
the judges have decided that ordinances requiring owners or occupiers to remove snow when violated can serve as a basis for negligence recovery.7 6 This does not square with the notion of allowing
recovery only where interests of the specific class protected are invaded.
Type of risk covered. A similar limitation upon recoveries to
that of restriction to the legislatively protected class is provided by
the rule limiting recovery "where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular hazard [to cases where] the invasion of the interest results from that hazard... ."77 The English case
of Gorrisv. Scott 78 is the leading illustration of this principle. There
the defendant violated a provision requiring water carriers to provide
pens for animals shipped with them. This law obviously was designed to prevent contagion due to overcrowding, and had disease
broken out the plaintiff gould have recovered. The failure to comply
71 The West Virginia Sunday "Blue Laws" are at W.
8, §§ 17, 18 (Michie 1955).

VA. CoDE

ch. 61, art.

For a Virginia case refusing to apply a law prohibiting operation of trains

on the Sabbath, See Hortenstine v. Virginia-Carolina By., 102 Va. 914, 47 S.E.
996 (1904).

For a discussion of Sunday closing laws, see Gregory, Breach of Criminal

Licensing
Statutes in Civil Litigation, 36 CoRN. L.Q. 622, 638-39 (1951).
72

See, e.g., Hersman v. Rane County Court, 86 W. Va. 96, 102 S.E. 810

(1920). See also Southern Ry. v. Vaughan, 118 Va. 692, 88 S.E. 305, 23
W. VA.
7 L.Q. 286 (1916); Gregory, supra note 71, at 622.
3 See, e.g., State Road Comm'n v. Ball, 138 W. Va. 349, 76 S.E.2d 55
(1953).
74
PnossER, TORTS § 34.
supra note 28, at 329.

See also Morris, supra note 2, at 468; Thayer,

75
W. VA. CoDE ch. 17, art. 10, § 17 (Michie 1955).
7
6 See, e.g., Barniak v. Grossman, 93 S.E.2d 49, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 90
(W. Va. 1956); Morris v. Wheeling, 140 W. Va. 78, 82 S.E.2d 586 (1954);
Rich v.
Rosenshine, 131 W. Va. 30, 45 S.E.2d 499 (1947).
7
'1REsTATamENT, ToRTs § 286 (c)
N.GaIENcE § 12.
8

(1934).

SnmAsmAN & REDFmEL,

7 L.R. 9 Ex. 125 (1874).
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with the statute, however, led to washing the plaintiff's sheep overboard. The court refused to grant recovery for the loss because the
damage was not of the sort contemplated.
In a Virginia case compensation was denied to a plaintiff whose
animals escaped him because of an unlawful obstruction of a street
by the defendant railway. 79 The law was devised to prevent delays
in traffic along the street, not to protect against losses of livestock
caused by the position of the train.
The West Virginia court has not been very illuminating concerning this rule. In one case by inference it cast doubt on allowing
a farmer to recover for losses brought about by his inability to work
fields on the other side of a track which was unfenced in violation of
a legislative command. 80 The enactment intended to prevent collisions. The plaintiff's loss did not result from that hazard. In Oldfield v. Woodall8 l the court permitted a plaintiff colliding with an illegally parked vehicle to recover. Other courts have held that parking ordinances are not intended to prevent collisions but are designed
to regulate parking.8 2 Persons who are unable to park because of
the illegal parking are those who come within the risk at which the
law was aimed.
Ca s'ation. Commission of an act prohibited by legislation
makes the actor liable in tort only if the violation is the legal cause of
the invasion of the plaintiff's interest.83 "Illegality" is an abstract
term which itself causes nothing. The acts characterized as the
breach are what might be causal in nature.8 4 In West Virginia those
acts which constitute violation of a statute are considered causal in a
negligence case if there would have been no accident had the defendant adhered to the legislative command. If the injury would
have taken place even had there been no criminal violation, then
79

Richmond & D.R.R. v. Noell, 86 Va. 19, 9 S.E. 473 (1889).

80 Clark v. Ohio R.R.R., 84 W. Va. 200, 12 S.E. 505 (1890).

81113 W. Va. 35, 166 S.E. 691 (1932).
.2 See cases cited in PRossaR, ToRTs . 84 nn.88, 39.
83 REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (d) (1934).
See generally, Green, supra
note 40, at 8.
The allegations of negligence must sufficiently indicate that the violation
was the natural and proximate cause of the injury. Cf. Griffith v. American
Coal Co., 75 W. Va. 686, 84 S.E. 621 (1915).
84 Davis, Plaintiff's Illegal Act as a Defense in Actions of Tort, 18 HArr.

L. REv. 505, 507 (1905).
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the defendant's acts are not viewed as the proximate cause.8 5 For
example, in a case dealing with breach of a command to trolley operators to install a certain type of fender the court stated:
"If it can be shown that the accident would not have occurred it
the car had been equipped with such fender... and that the
car was not equipped with such fender, then this would be negligence sufficient to charge the company. But, upon the other
hand, if it could be shown that the accident would have happened if the car had been equipped with such fender, the same
as it did when no so equipped, then the omission to provide
86
such fender would not be the proximate cause of the injury."
Intervening acts can, of course, isolate the defendant's criminal acts
87
from being considered causative.
Should an expansive view of causation be taken the requirement
would become virtually meaningless. When a court imputes or infers a causal connection merely because of the fact of violation,
causation would follow in most statutory breach cases.88 When
judges go that far they are really making a policy determination favoring automatic liability.8 9 A code provision in West Virginia
checks that tendency in motor vehicle speeding cases. It states that
speed laws "... shall not be construed to relieve the plaintiff in any
civil action from the burden of proving negligence on the part of the
defendant as the proximate cause of an accident."90
Causation in most instances is considered a question for determination by a jury9 ' acting under proper instructions. 92 Reasonable
85 See, e.g., Ashley v. Kanawha Valley Traction Co., 60 W. Va. 306, 55
S.E. 1016 (1906). Cf. Tarr v. Keller Lumber & Constr. Co., 106 W. Va. 99,
144 S.E.
881 (1928).
86
Ashley v. Kanawha Valley Traction Co., 60 W. Va. 306, 316, 55 S.E.
1016, 1020 (1906).
87 See, e.g., Miller v. Douglas, 121 W. Va. 638, 5 S.E.2d 799 (1989).
88
Sni UurAN & R==sEU, NEGLIGENCE § 11.
This is done in some jurisdictions in licensing statute cases. Gregory, supra
note 89
71, at 622.
Green, supra note 40, at 15.
In West Virginia some child labor cases indicate adoption of such a policy.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Turkey Gap Coal & Coke Co., 104 W. Va. 134, 139
S.E. 642 (1927); Daniel v. Big Sandy Coal & Coke Co., 68 W. Va. 490, 69
S.E. 993 (1910).
90W. VA. CODE ch. 17C, art. 6, § 6 (Michie 1955).
91
Walker v. Robertson, 91 S.E.2d 468 (W. Va. 1956); Darling v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 136 W. Va. 303, 69 S.E.2d 139 (1951); Skaff v. Dodd, 130
W. Va. 540, 44 S.E.2d 621 (1947); Meyn v. Dulaney-Miller Auto Co., 118
W. Va. 545, 191 S.E. 558 (1937).
92 Myers v. Charleston Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 564, 37 S.E.2d 281
(1946).
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findings will not be upset.9 3 Too often courts abdicate their functions to juries in so-called proximate cause cases which really involve
issues of statutory construction. Lack of causal relation is not a
94
proper factor in many cases that turn on it.

The court of appeals has at various times made proximate cause
sounds instead of plainly articulating its views concerning statutory
interpretation. Thus it has noted lack of causation where it has
found the statute inapplicable to the acts done, that they did not
constitute criminal conduct.9 5 It has permitted juries to excuse violations through use of the proximate cause rubric.90 Sometimes when
the court has found that the plaintiffs class was not covered by an
enactment it has expressed that conclusion in proximate cause language.97 Also there has been a tendency to mix questions of proximate causation with those of contributory negligence.98 While it is
true that to defeat a cause of action contributory negligence must be
a proximate cause in the same manner that a defendant's illegal acts
must be causal, beyond this the two doctrines are distinct. Certainly
contributory negligence does not have to be the sole cause to bar
recovery, so presence of other causal factors does not necessarily determine the case. 99
Effect of legislative violation. Once it has been established that
there has been statutory disobedience and that none of the mitigating qualifications previously discussed work against the plaintiff, the
98 Cf. Baltimore
& O.R.R. v. Green, 136 F.2d 88 (4th Cir. 1943) (failure
to provide signal required by law may well have been found by jury to be the

cause).
94

Green, supra note 40, at 15.

95 See, e.g., Harper v. Cook, 139 W. Va. 917, 82 S.E.2d 427 (1954);
Fleming v. McMillan, 125 W. Va. 356, 26 S.E.2d 8 (1943); Cooper v. Teter,
123 W. Va. 372, 15 S.E.2d 152 (1941); Ewing v. Chapman, 91 W. Va. 641,
114 S.E.
158 (1922).
9

6 See, e.g., Morris v. Wheeling, 140 W. Va. 78, 82 S.E.2d 536 (1954);
Snyder v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 135 W. Va. 751, 65 S.E.2d 74 (1951); Somerville 9v. Dellosa, 183 W. Va. 435, 56 S.E.2d 756 (1944).
7 See, e.g., Rich v. Rosenshine, 131 W. Va. 30, 45 S.E.2d 499 (1947);
Steiner v. Muldrew, 114 W. Va. 801, 173 S.E. 891 (1934). See also State
Road Corm'n v. Ball, 188 W. Va. 849, 76 S.E.2d 55 (1953) (actor excused
because of proximate cause when real basis was fact statute imposed duty
on public
official).
98
See, e.g., Virginian Ry. v. Armentrout, 158 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1946);
Scott v. Hoosier Engineering Co., 117 W. Va. 395, 185 S.E. 553 (1936); Jones
v. Virginian By., 115 W. Va. 665, 177 S.E. 621 (1934); Powell v. Mitchell,
120 W. Va. 9, 196 S.E. 158 (1938); Beyel v. Newport N. & M.V.R.R., 34
W. Va. 538, 12 S.E. 532 (1890).
99
Green, supra note 40, at 11, 12.
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question of the procedural effect of such proof arises. Three main
views have been advanced. The negligence per se approach treats
the violation as establishing negligence; the jury is instructed that,
if the violation is found, they are to hold for the plaintiff. The evidence of negligence view treats a showing of statutory breach as evidence that the defendant has not acted as a reasonable, prudent
man; the court instructs the jury that it can consider the violation in
connection with its determination of whether the defendant's acts
were reasonable. The prima facie evidence of negligence variation
on that approach considers proof of violation evidence which, unless rebutted by the defendant, will establish that the defendant has
not acted reasonably and hence must compensate the plaintiff.10 0
There is no reason why in any jurisdiction all legislation must be
treated one way or the other. 10 1 But there does not seem to be any
valid reason for giving different procedural effects to the same sort
of statute at different times. The West Virginia court has held consistenfly that breach of the child labor laws is prima facie evidence
of negligence. 1 02 In consideration of other statutes, however, it has
at times used the negligence per se method,1 0 3 sometimes relied upon
evidence of negligence, 0 4 and in still other instances preferred prima

100 For further explanation of the meaning of the prima facie evidence
rule, see Morris v. Wheeling, 140 W. Va. 78, 93, 82 S.E.2d 536, 544 (1954).
In that case it was explained that a "prima facie case of actionable negligence
is that state of facts which will support a jury finding that the defendant was
guilty of negligene and that it is a "case which has proceeded upon sufficient proof to the stage where it must be submitted to a jury and not decided
against the plaintiff as a matter of law."
101 In the same jurisdiction there might be some statutes which, upon
construction, seem to call for one rule, say the prima facie evidence of negligence rule, while other enactments might be construed to more logically call
for another approach, such as the negligence per se rule.
102 See, e.g., Tarr v. Keller Lumber & Constr. Co., 106 W. Va. 99, 144
S.E. 881 (1928); Bobbs v. Morgantown Press Co., 89 W. Va. 206, 108 S.E.
879 (1921), 28 W. VA. L.Q. 283 (1922); Waldron v. Garland Pocahontas Coal
Co., 89 W. Va. 426, 109 S.E. 729 (1921); Mangus v. Proctor-Eagle Coal Co.,
87 W. Va. 718, 105 S.E. 909 (1921); Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal
Co., 68 W. Va. 405, 69 S.E. 857 (1910).
103 See e.g., Ambrose v. Young, 100 W. Va. 452, 180 S.E. 810 (1925); Krodel
v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 99 W. Va. 374, 128 S.E. 824 (1925) (breach of statute
negligence per se; violation of ordinance ordinary negligence); Melton v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 71 W. Va. 701, 78 S.E. 369 (1913); Bowles v. Chesapeake & 0. By., 61 W. Va. 272, 57 S.E. 131 (1907); Ashley v. Kanawha Valley
Traction
Co., 60 W. Va. 306, 55 S.E. 1016 (1906).
10
4 See, e.g., Jones v. Virginian Ry., 115 W. Va. 665, 177 S.E. 621 (1934);
Krodel v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 99 W. Va. 374, 128 S.E. 824 (1925) (violation
of ordinance evidence of negligence; violation of statute negligence per se).
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facie evidence of negligence. 10 5 The court recognized that inconsistency 106 and in Oldfteld v. Woodall' 0 7 firmly committed this jurisdiction to the prima facie evidence of negligence rule. In a recent
pronouncement it stated that ".... the rule prevailing in this jurisdic-

tion considers... violation of a statute or ordinance only as prima
08
facie evidence of negligence."
In its swings back and forth between these rules the court has
not been very explicit about the reasons for using one approach instead of another. Each method, though, has had very articulate proponents. Professor Thayer in his discussion of the subject stated the
usual reasoning upon which the negligence per se rule is founded. 10 9
According to him a man who is not reasonably prudent is negligent,
and a reasonably prudent man would not violate the criminal law, so
therefore, if the civil courts find for defendants who have committed
crimes, they are finding for negligent defendants, which is contrary
to the fundamentals of the law of negligence and should not be tolerated. 110 This approach neatly fits into the reasons for adopting legislative standards and provides a measure of stability by keeping the
question of setting the standard of conduct out of the uncertainty of
the jury room.
An article by Professor Lowndes pumped for the evidence of
negligence rule. He reasoned that since application of the standard
of conduct, a jury function, is so subjective, the determination of it
105 Probably the earliest case so holding was Tompkins v. Kanawha Board,
21 W. Va. 224 (1882).
106 Oldfield v. Woodall, 113 W. Va. 35, 166 S.E. 691 (1932). Also it
has through the years since made reference to its former inconsistency. See,
e.g., Morris v. Wheeling, 140 W. Va. 78, 82 S.E.2d 536 (1954); Snyder v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 135 W. Va. 751, 65 S.E.2d 74 (1951). So too have the
federal courts. See, e.g., Linde Air Products Co. v. Cameron, 82 F.2d 22 (4th
Cir. 1936).
107113 W. Va. 35, 166 S.E. 691 (1932), 39 W. VA. L.Q. 268 (1933).

108 Brumfield v. Wofford, 102 S.E.2d 103, 104-05 (W. Va. 1958).
For other cases applying the prima facie rule, see Pitzer v. M. D. Tomkies

& Sons, 136 W. Va. 268, 67 S.E.2d 437 (1951) (trial court correctly denied instruction saying violation "merely a circumstance to be considered");
Moore v. Skyline Cab, Inc.. 134 W. Va. 121, 59 S.E.2d 437 (1950) (lower
court reversed because gave instruction saying negligence as a matter of law);
Somerville v. Dellosa, 183 W. Va. 435, 56 S.E.2d 756 (1949) (instruction

erroneous which led jury to believe could find negligence per se).

For earlier cases in which defendants lost who did not rebut prima facie

cases, see Bowling v. Guyan Lumber Co., 105 W. Va. 309, 143 S.E. 86 (1928);
Wills v. Montfair Gas Coal Co., 104 W. Va. 12, 138 S.E. 749 (1927).
109 Thayer, supra note 28, at 317.
110 Id. at 322; Gregory, supra note 71, at 627.
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is really in the hands of the jury, unless the legislature takes it away.
He then argued that the per se view was merely a round about way
of saying violation of legislation creates civil liability when the
legislature did not so provide. Lowndes believed that failure to conform to a statutory standard constitutes carelessness and, consequently, it is fair to submit that to a jury.11 1 This approach is open
to the serious objection that it leads to jury lawlessness. 112 To get
around that it has been argued that varying the rule to make proof
of violation prima facie evidence, rather than ordinary evidence,
mitigates this. l" 3 Be that as it may, Thayer's objection still stands:
the prima facie evidence rule means that a prima facie impropriety
14
can be rebutted.
Although the negligence per se position still is the majority rule
in the country, there is a growing number of jurisdictions that have
adopted the same rule as has West Virginia."15 This is due to the
flexibility that it affords. In some instances there are excellent reasons for not mounting civil liability on the framework of criminal disobedience. There are administrative methods to temper the possible
miscarriages of justice in the criminal field that are not available in
the civil courts. Also certain petty crimes under the negligence per
se rule might lead to massive civil liability. 1 6 Prima facie negligence is not so procrustean as negligence per se.
Perhaps correct application of the negligence per se view and
proper use of prima facie negligence might both tend to achieve in
the same case the same justifiable result.117 The most serious objections to negligence per se can be overcome by reliance upon the
statutory purpose and excused violation doctrines, and by restricting
recovery to instances where the plaintiff is of the class protected and
the injury is caused by the risk sought to be prevented."18 Jury
lawlessness in prima facie evidence of negligence cases can be pre"' Lowndes, supra note 28, at 367-69.
For expression of that objection, see Gregory, supra note 71, at 627;
Thayer, supra note 28, at 322-23.
113 Comment, 89 W. VA. L.Q. 268, 270 (1933).
114 Thayer, supra note 28, at 324.
315 2 HARPER & JAmxs, ToRTs § 17.6.
116 Ibid. See also Mours, ToRTs 144.
117 Oldfield v. Woodall, 113 W. Va. 35, 42, 166 S.E. 691, 694 (1932); 2
HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS § 17.6; MoRmus, TORTS 162.
118 2 HARPER & JAmes, TORTS § 17.6.
112
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vented by keeping cases from jurymen when no reasonable jury
could find other than as the court would.' 1 9
Delegated legislation, that is lawmaking by city councils and
administrative agencies, raises the question whether such rules
should be given the same effect as statutes. 120 As to ordinances, the
West Virginia court has, but for one noticable slip, 12 1 answered
yes. 12 2 If the municipalities are acting within the power given them,
their legislation is every bit as much an expression of the sovereign
will as are the contents of the state code. As to administrative regulations, in Rinehart v. Woodford Flying Service,'2 3 probably through
inadvertence, the court implied by its actions that violation was negligence per se. This cannot be. If administrative legislation is to
have a different procedural effect than statutes enacted by the state
legislature, that impact must be less, not greater. Probably today the
court would adopt the approach that it uses in the ordinance casesviolation of administrative quasi-legislation is prima facie evidence
of negligence.

12 4

2. STATUTOIY VxoInoNs AND CoNTRmuToRY NELIJGENCZ
Violations by the defendant. A party who has broken the criminal law is liable in a negligence action only when "the other has
not so conducted himself as to disable himself from maintaining an
action."125 The defense of contributory negligence is open to the
defendant. While it is true that a plaintiff has a right to assume that

119 Moms, ToRTs 161-62. Cf. Snyder v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 135 W. Va.

751, 65 S.E.2d 74 (1951); Moore v. Skyline Cab, Inc., 134 W. Va. 121, 59
S.E.2d 487 (1950).
120 The Restatement notes that they should be treated the same. RESTATEwmmur, Toars § 285, comment b (1934).

See also 1 SHEARAN

&

EDEnELD,

NEGLIGENCE §§ 17, 18.
21

1 IKrodel v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 99 W. Va. 874, 128 S.E. 824 (1925)
(violation ol ordinance evidence of negligence; violation of statute negligence

per se).
122 See e.g., Walker v. Robertson, 91 S.E.2d 468 (W. Va. 1956); Rich
v. Rosenshine, 181 W. Va. 30, 45 S.E.2d 499 (1947); Skaff v. Dodd, 130 W. Va.
540, 44 S.E.2d 621 (1947).
123 122 W. Va. 392, 9 S.E.2d 521 (1940).
124 For a general discussion of administrative rules and tort law, see
Momus, TonTs 182; Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in
Negligence Actions, 28 TEX. L. R v.148 (1949).
125 yESrAT.EmmNT, TonTs § 286 (d) (1934).
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12 7
others will obey the law, 126 still he must act as a reasonable man
and a man of reasonable prudence knows that the time might come
when he will have to act in the face of lawbreaking. Furthermore
even a defendant who has violated a statute is entitled to assume that
the plaintiff will not only obey the law but also will act reason12 8
ably.

As the result of application of these doctrines plaintiffs who have
possessed the right of way at intersections or on the highways have
been denied recovery; they have not acted reasonably.12 9 Persons
struck by nonsignalling trains have been refused compensation on
the ground that it is unreasonable for them merely to rely on the
signals required by law; they also must look and listen for trains., 0
Also drivers must keep a weather eye out for illegally parked vehicles. It has been held that inattention by a plaintiff and his failure
to turn out to dodge an unlawfully parked truck constituted contributory negligence. 13 '
Where the defendant disobeys a child labor act 32 a somewhat
different problem arises. In Norman v. Virginia-PocahontasCoal
Co.,'3 3 the West Virginia court noted that a guilty employer could
use the defense of contributory negligence if he was able to demonstrate that the child contributing to his own injury possessed extraordinary wisdom and full appreciation of his danger. That ruling

126 Boggess v. Monongahela West Penn Public Service Co., 107 W. Va.
88, 147 S.E. 480 (1929); Canterbury v. Director General of R.R., 87 W. Va.
238, 104 S.E. 597 (1920).
127

Steiner v. Muldrew, 114 W. Va. 801, 178 S.E. 891 (1984); Canterbury

v. Director General of R.R., 87 W. Va. 238, 104 S.E. 597 (1920).
12 8

Twyman v. Monongahela West Penn Pub. Serv. Co., 118 W. Va. 380,

191 S.E. 541 (1937).
129 See, e.g., Adkins v. Smith, 98 S.E.2d 712 (W. Va. 1957); Webb v.
Batten, 117 W. Va. 644, 187 S.E. 825 (1986); Jones v. Cook, 96 W. Va. 60,
128 S.E. 407 (1924); Burdette v. Henson, 96 W. Va. 31, 122 S.E. 356 (1924).
130 See, e.g., Arrowood v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 127 W. Va. 310, 32 S.E.2d
634 (1944); Jones v. Virginian Ry., 74 W. Va. 666, 83 S.E. 54 (1914); Beyel

v. Newport N. & M.V.R.R., 34 W. Va. 538, 12 S.E. 532 (1890).
131 Scott v. Hoosier Engineering Co., 117 W. Va. 395, 185 S.E. 553
(1936).
132 W. VA. CODE ch. 21, art. 6, §§ 1-10 (Michie 1955).
13" 68 W. Va. 405, 69 S.E. 857 (1910).
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was followed' 3 4 until Pitzer v. M. D. Tomkies & Sons, 135 which expressly overruled it. There in a holding which placed West Virginia
in line with the weight of authority' 3 6 the court decided that contributory negligence of a child employed contrary to the child labor
law was not available as a defense to employers in suits based on
such violations. The court reasoned that application of the principle
of contributory negligence "virtually emasculates the provisions of
the statute... 137 " This it was no longer willing to do.
Violations by the plaintiff. The plaintiffs contributory negligence might consist of his violation of a legislative enactment. If
lawbreaking by defendants is prima facie evidence of negligence,
then criminal disobedience by plaintiffs should amount to prima facie
evidence of contributory negligence.1 38 Thus where a claimant
against a railroad drove onto its tracks without looking, a violation
of a stop-for-trains law, that act was held to be prima facie evidence
of contributory negligence. 139 Jaywalking plaintiffs' 40 and those in
the street outside of designated crosswalks 141 should be similarly
treated. They have broken the law.
In Myers v. CharlestonTransit Co.,i 4 a bus line was sued by a
pedestrian who had been sideswiped by one of its vehicles. Its
134 See, e.g., Wills v. Montfair Gas Coal Co., 104 W. Va. 12, 188 S.E.
749 (1927); Griffith v. American Coal Co., 75 W. Va. 686, 84 S.E. 621
(1915); Honaker v. New River & Pocahontas Consol. Coal Co., 71 W. Va. 177,
76 S.E. 180 (1912); Blankenship v. Ethel Coal Co., 69 W. Va. 74, 70 S.E.
863 (1911); Burke v. Big Sandy Coal & Coke Co., 68 W. Va. 421, 69 S.E. 992

(1910).

For cases concerning the special problem created by allegations that the
parent of a child killed consented to his unlawful employment, see Irvine v.

Union Tanning Co., 97 W. Va. 388, 125 S.E. 110 (1924); Waldron v. Garland

Pocahontas Coal Co., 89 W. Va. 426, 109 S.E. 729 (1921); Dickinson v. Stuart
Colliery Co., 71 W. Va. 325, 76 S.E. 054 (1912); Daniel v. Big Sandy Coal
& Coke Co., 68 W. Va. 490, 69 S.E. 993 (1910).
135

(1952).

186 W. Va. 268, 67 S.E.2d 437 (1951), 54 W. VA. L. REv. 321

136RSrAThmNT, TORTS §
37
1 Pitzer v. M. D. Tonmkdes

442 (1951).
38

483 (1934).

&Sons, 136 W. Va. 268, 274, 67 S.E.2d 487,

1 For discussions of violations by the plaintiff, see 2 HAmwu
TOnTs § 17.6; PRossER, TORTS § 34.

& JAmEs,

For general discussions of contributory negligence, see Green, supra note

40, at133;
Thayer, supra note 28, at 338; Davis, supra note 84, at 505.
9
New Y.C.R.R. v. Casto, 216 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1954).
140 Walker v. Robertson, 91 S.E.2d 468 (W. Va. 1956).
141 SkaF v. Dodd, 130 W. Va. 540, 44 S.E.2d 621 (1947).
142 128 W. Va. 564, 37 S.E.2d 281 (1946).
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defense was the violation by the plaintiff of the law against public
intoxication. It sought an unqualified instruction based on drunkenness under all circumstances. The trial judge and the appellate court
agreed that such was an improper instruction. A defendant who
uses statutory violation as the basis for his defense has to combat the
statutory purpose and reasonable violation doctrines, he must show
that the acts constituting the violation proximately caused the accident, and he should demonstrate that the regulation was for the
protection of his class. 143 Here at least the last mentioned of these
limitations would have prevented use of the defense attempted.

3.

STATUTORY CoPLIANCE

Related to the question of the relationship of a breach of a
criminal statute to liability in a tort suit is the problem of the effect
of conformity. In some jurisdictions in the past there was authority
for the proposition that conformity did establish freedom from negligence. 144 If statutes establish standards of conduct, then those adhering to them do come up to officially accepted standards. 14 5 But
legislation usually gives only a minimum gauge for conduct and that
does not necessarily preclude a finding that the actor was negligent
in failing to take additional care.146 The requirement of driving at
a posted speed does not mean that one who is otherwise negligent
because of failure to keep his car under control is immunized from
tort liability by legislative action. 147 Nor is a defendant who brings
himself within a statutory exception relieved of his common law duty
to act as a prudent man. 148 In fact in the courts of West Virginia it
has been held that refusal of an instruction mentioning only the
statutory liability for driving without lights was correct. Such an
instruction was incomplete in that it did not also mention the possibility of violation of a nonstatutory duty to avoid endangering highway travellers. 149

14

3

Pnossmi, TORTS § 84 nn.96-99.

144 See cases cited in Momus, ToRTs 174 n.73.

145 Id. at 173. As to administrative legislation, see Morris, The Role of
Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence Actions, 28 TEX. L. REv. 148
(1949).
1
46 P ossEn, TORTS § 84.
147 Cf. Sigmon v. Mundy, 125 W. Va. 591, 25 S.E.2d 636 (1948).
148 Divita v. Atlantic Trucking Co., 129 W. Va. 267, 40 S.E.2d 824
(1946); ef. Vaughan v. Oates, 128 W. Va. 554, 37 S.E.2d 479 (1946).
149 Wilson v. Edwards, 188 W. Va. 613, 77 S.E.2d 164 (1958).
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